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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME III SUMMER, 1949 NUMBER 3
SURVEY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE
THE 1948 REVISION AND FIRST INTERPRETATIVE DECISIONS
Whitney R. Harris*
T HE steady improvement in the administration of justice in the
federal courts, marked by the adoption of the Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States District Courts on September 1,
1938' and the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States
District Courts on March 21, 1946,2 has been further advanced
by the enactment into positive law of Titles 18 and 28 of the
United States Code, each effective September 1, 1948.' Numerous
articles have been published concerning the changes effected in
federal court practice and procedure by the new rules of civil and
criminal procedure adopted for the district courts.4 The purpose
of this article will be to comment upon significant changes in sub-
stantive and adjective law accomplished by the revision and re-
codification of Title 28, "Judiciary and Judicial Procedure," of
*Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
I Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts
to conform to the revision of Title 28 were adopted by the Supreme Court on December
29, 1948.
2 Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District
Courts to conform to the revision of Titles 28 and 18 were adopted by the Supreme
Court on December 27, 1948.
3 Title 18 was enacted as Chapter 645-Public Law 772, Laws of the 80th Congress;
Title 28 was enacted as Chapter 646-Public Law 773, Laws of the 80th Congress. The
new codes constitute law, not merely prima facie law. It is unnecesary to refer to other
statutes. Future changes will be framed as amendments to the codes rather than to prior
statutes. See note 5 intra.
4 See Miller, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 TULANE L. REV. 99 (1938);
Wheaton, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Interpreted, 25 CORN. L. Q. 28 (1939);
Potts, New Rules of Criminal Procedure-A Suggestion, 23 TEx. L REv. 215 (1945);
Orfield, The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 543 (1945) ; Des-
sion, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 55 YALE L. J. 694 (1946) and
56 YALE L. J. 197, (1947).
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the United States Code,5 in the light of the first decisions constru-
ing the code as so revised.
ORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS
The revision provides that in each judicial district there shall
be a district court known as the United States District Court for
the district,6 and that in each circuit there shall be a court of
appeals known as the United States Court of Appeals for the cir-
cuit.' In each district having more than one judge the district
judge senior in commission is denominated the chief judge of the
district court,' and in each circuit the circuit judge senior in com-
mission is denominated the chief judge of the circuit.'
The District of Columbia is now formally included as one of
the eleven judicial circuits." This designation is in line with nu-
merous Acts of Congress" and prevous decisions of the Supreme
Court. 2 Alaska, the Canal Zone, and the Virgin Islands have been
incorporated into the Ninth, Fifth, and Third judicial circuits, re-
spectively."8 Hawaii and Puerto Rico have been designated sep-
arate judicial districts. 4
The annual October term of the Supreme Court is retained in
5 On May 24, 1949, by Chapter 139-Public Law 72, Laws of the 81st Congress, the
revised Titles 18 and 28 were extensively amended for the purpose of correcting typo-
graphical and other minor errors, clarifying the language of some sections to conform
more closely to the original law, and removing ambiguities discovered in the revisions
of September 1, 1948.
628 U.S.C. 1 132(a) (1948).
7 28 U.S.C. § 43 (a) (1948) eliminates the word "circuit" from the former name of
the court. 28 U.S.C. § 212 (1490).
8 28 U.S.C. § 136(a) (1948). Use of term "chief judge" in place of "senior district
judge" is in recognition of increase in administrative duties of the office.
9 28 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1948). Use of term "chief judge" in place of "senior circuit
judge" is in recognition of increase in administrative duties of the office.
1028 U.S.C. § 41 (1948).
11 See Acts of Congress listed in reviser's notes to Title 28, reported in UNiTED
STATES CODE CONcaESSIONAL SEvcE (1948).
12 Comm'r. v. Bedford's Estate, 325 U. S. 283, 65 S. Ct. 1157, 89 L. Ed. 611 (1945);
Swift and Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311, 48 S. Ct. 311, 72 L Ed. 587 (1928).
1a 28 U.S.C. H§ 41 and 1294 (1948).
1428 U.S.C. §191 and 119 (1948).
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the revision,1' but hereafter the terms and sessions of other
courts will be fixed by rule of court rather than by statute.16
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court has original juris-
diction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and those in which a state is a party."7 The power
resides in Congress to determine the extent to which such jurisdic-
tion shall be exclusive."8 Until the present revision Congress had
not provided that the Supreme Court should have exclusive juris-
diction in civil cases between states. 9 The law now provides that
the Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
of controversies between two or more states, and likewise of
actions or proceedings against ambassadors or other public min.
isters of foreign states.20
The law formerly provided that the Supreme Court should
have original jurisdiction of controversies between a state and
citizens of other states or aliens.2 This was partially in conflict
with the 11th Amendment which prohibits an action in any federal
court against a state by citizens of another state or aliens. The in-
consistency has been eliminated in the revision which gives origi-
nal but not exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of actions
or proceedings by a state against the citizens of another state or
against aliens.22 Under the revision, the Supreme Court likewise
has original but not exclusive jurisdiction of actions or proceed-
ings brought by ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign
states or to which consuls or vice consuls of foreign states are
15 28 U.S.C. § 2 (1948).
le 28 U.S.C. §'48 and 138 (1948).
17 U. S. CONST., Art. III, § 2.
Is Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 4 S. Ct. 437, 28 L. Ed. 482 (1884).
19 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 20 S. Ct. 251, 44 L. Ed. 347 (1900).
2028 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1948).
2128 U.S.C. § 341 (1940).
2228 U.S.C § 1251(b) (1948).
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parties, and of controversies between the United States and a
state.n
No important changes have been made in the revision with re-
spect to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURTS
The revision provides that the courts of appeals shall have juris-
diction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
of the United States, the District Court for the Territory of
Alaska, the United States District Court for the District of the
Canal Zone, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."' The
original jurisdiction of the district courts remains basically the
same under the revision.2"
Article III of the Constitution extends the judicial power of
the United States to cases and controversies "between citizens of
different States."26 By the Judiciary Act of 1789 Congress gave
the inferior federal courts jurisdiction over cases "between a
citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of an-
other State."2? In Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey,2" decided in
1804, the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Mar-
shall, held that the District of Columbia could not be considered
a state for jurisdictional purposes within the meaning of the Ju-
diciary Act, and that the judicial power of the United States did
not, therefore, extend to cases between citizens of the District of
Columbia and citizens of states. This decision was law for the
following 136 years, although from time to time criticism was
made of the consequent inequities. 9
23 Ibid.
24 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1948).
: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332 (1948).
2o U. S. CoNST. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2T Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, 1 STAT. 73, 78, § 11.
28 6 U. S. 445, 2 L. Ed. 332 (1804).
29 Thus in Watson v. Brooks, 13 Fed. 540 (C.C. D. Ore. 1882) the court, after stat-
ing that it was doubtful whether the same decision would now be made, said that "it
is to be hoped it may yet be reviewed and overthrown."
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In 1940 Congress attempted to remove the jurisdictional
impediment to suits in the district courts between citizens of the
District of Columbia and citizens of states,"0 and its intent to ac-
complish this end was clearly stated in the revision which defines
the word "States" as used in the diversity section to include the
Territories and the District of Columbia."' Such legislation gives
rise to obvious constitutional difficulties, in view of the historic
interpretation of Article III of the Constitution as setting the limits
of judicial power which Congress may confer upon the constitu-
tional courts.8" To overcome these constitutional limitations either
the word "States" as used in Article III would have to be con-
strued as including the District of Columbia for jurisdictional
purposes,8 or some other source of power would have to be found
in the Constitution enabling Congress to vest in the constitutional
courts jurisdiction in excess of the limits of Article III.
The constitutionality of the 1940 amendment, which had been
considered with conflicting results in the lower courts,3 came
under review of the Supreme Court in National Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., decided June 20, 1949. 8" The Court, in
a five to four decision, upheld the constitutionality of the 1940
amendment, and inferentially the 1948 amendment, although the
majority divided three to two on the basis for the decision. Two
justices86 would have overruled Hepburn and Dundas v. Elizey;
three justices, 7 without overruling that formidable precedent,
30 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) was amended to give the district courts jurisdiction where a
controversy is "between citizens of different States, or citizens of the District of Co-
lumbia, the Territory of Hawaii, or Alaska, and any State or Territory."
31 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1948).
32 Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U. S. 303, 3 L. Ed. 108 (1809).
33 And overruling Hepburn and Dundas v. ElIzey, note 28 supra.
34 Of twelve district courts that had considered the question prior to review by the
Supreme Court, nine had held the enabling Act unconstitutional, and the two Courts
of Appeals which had considered the matter had reached that conclusion. Only three
district courts had held the enabling Act constitutional. See cases cited in National
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 69 S. Ct. 1173, 1174, note 4, (1949).
25 - .---- U. S -............. 69 S. Ct. 1173 -............ L. Ed -............ (1949).
" Justices Rutledge and Murphy.
37 Justices Jackson, Black and Burton.
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would have found the constitutional basis for the extension of
jurisdiction in the power of Congress under Article I of the Con-
stitution to exercise exclusive legislation over the District of Co-
lumbia."8 Four justices, 9 would neither have overruled Marshall's
decision nor have found any such power elsewhere in the Constitu-
tion. "And so," in the Shakespearian prose of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, "conflicting minorities in combination bring to pass a re-
sult-paradoxical as it may appear-which differing majorities
of the Court find insupportable."4
The law formerly denied jurisdiction to district courts over
suits to recover upon promissory notes or other choses in action
(other than foreign bills of exchange or corporate bearer paper)
brought by an assignor unless such suit might have been prose-
cuted in the district court where filed if no assignment had been
made." This provision was known as the "assignee clause" and
had been in force since the Judiciary Act of 1789. The purpose
of the assignee clause at the time of its enactment was said to
have been "to prevent the conferring of jurisdiction on the Fed-
eral courts, on grounds of diversity of citizenship, by assignment,
in cases where it would not otherwise exist."'8
In 1875 a provision was added to the law to the effect that if it
should appear to the satisfaction of a district court that any suit
commenced therein or removed to that court from a state court
did not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy
properly within its jurisdiction, or that the parties to said suit had
been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs
or defendants, f0orthe plurpose of creating a case within the juris-
diction of the district court, it should proceed no further therein,
s U. S. CONsT. Art. 1, § 8, ci. 17.
89 Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Douglas joined in one dissenting opinion;
Justices Frankfurter and Reed joined in another dissenting opinion.
40 69 S. Ct. 1173, at 1200.
4128 U.S.C. § 41(0) (1940).
42 New Orleans v. Quinlan, 173 U. S. 191, 19 S. Ct. 329, 43 L. Ed. 664 (1899).
's Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 268 U. S. 449, 453, 45 S. Ct. 528, 529, 69 L Ed.
1041, 1048 i1925).
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but should dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from which
it was removed."' This broad language was held sufficient to reach
improper or collusive assignments of choses in action, including
foreign bills of exchange or corporate bearer paper which had
been excepted from the assignee clause."
In the revision, the assignee clause has been eliminated en-
tirely. The law now provides simply that a district court shall not
have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assign-
ment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or
joined to invoke jurisdiction." The former language authorizing
the district court to dismiss an action not really and substantially
involving a dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of the
court has been omitted as unnecessary, since the district court
has the inherent power and duty to dismiss any case not within
its jurisdiction, at the request of a party or upon its own motion.'7
VENUE IN THE DISTRICT COURTS
A civil action in which jurisdiction is founded only on diver-
sity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought only in the judicial district where all the plaintiffs or
all the defendants reside; a civil action in which jurisdiction is
not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only
in the judicial district where all the defendants reside, except
as otherwise provided by law.4
Under the revision, a corporation may be sued in any judicial
district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or
is doing business, and such judicial district is regarded as the
residence of such corporation for venue purposes.'9 In the ab-
sence of a comparable provision in the former law, the Supreme
Court held that the designation by a foreign corporation, in con-
44 28 U.S.C. § 80 (1940).
45 Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U. S. 179, 54 S. Ct. 177, 78 L. Ed. 254 (1933).
46 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1948).
47 Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 13 S. Ct. 906, 37 L Ed. 867 (1893).
4828 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (b) (1948).
49 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1948).
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formity with a valid statute of a state, of an agent upon whom
service of process might be made as a condition of doing business
within a state, was in effect a consent to be sued in the federal
courts of that state.5" The present venue provision extends that
rule to cases in which a corporation is doing business in a state
even though it has not designated an agent to receive service of
process.
Prior to 1948 there was no general provision for change of
venue between federal judicial districts.5 The revision contains
two such provisions, one relating to the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, the other to transfer of cases erroneously filed.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a court to dis-
miss an action that, from the standpoint of the convenience of
parties and witnesses, might more appropriately and justly be
tried in another court. It has been used in the federal courts sub
ject to the limitation that where choice of forum is authorized by
a special venue statute a discretion to dismiss will not be implied."2
In United States v. National City Lines,5" decided at the 1947
term of court, the Supreme Court held the doctrine of forum non
conveniens inapplicable to an action filed under the Clayton Act,
which has special venue provisions, on the theory "that whenever
Congress has vested courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine
causes and has invested complaining litigants with a right of
choice among them which is inconsistent with the exercise by those
courts of discretionary power to defeat the choice so made, the
doctrine can have no effect."54
The Federal Employers' Liability Act contains a special venue
section enabling the plaintiff to bring suit in the district of the resi-
dence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or
50 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167 (1939).
5128 U.S.C. §§ 119 and 163 (1940).
52Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947);
Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 67 S. Ct. 828, 91 L. Ed.
1067 (1947).
51 334 U. S. 573, 68 S. Ct. 1169, L. Ed. 1584 (1948).
54Id. at 596, 68 S. Ct. at 1181, 92 L. Ed. 1598.
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in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of com-
mencing such action.5 In Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 6
the Supreme Court held that this section gave the plaintiff such
right to select venue as to preclude a state court from enjoining
one of its own citizens from seeking relief in a federal court far
removed from the place of the accident, even though the court
recognized the inherent power of state courts to prevent a misuse
of litigation by enjoining resort to vexatious and oppressive
foreign suits.
The new section on forum non conveniens provides simply that,
for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of jus-
tice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.57 The ques-
tion immediately arose, upon enactment of this section, whether
the words "any civil action" were intended by Congress to broaden
the scope of the doctrine as previously applied in the federal
courts.5 8
On May 31, 1949, the Supreme Court handed down three
opinions construing the new section, two arising under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, and one (the National City Lines case
discussed above) arising under the Clayton Act." The effect of
the majority opinion in these cases is to make the doctrine of
forum non conveniens applicable to cases arising under these two
acts and, inferentially, to all other civil actions, irrespective of the
venue provisions of any act under which they may arise."0
5 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1948).
"6314 U. S. 44, 62 S. Ct. 6, 86 L. Ed. 28 (1941).
57 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1948).
58 In this connection see reviser's notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1948). H. R. REP'. No.
308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
59 Ex parte Collett, Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., and United States v.
National City Lines, reported in 17 U. S. LAw WEEx 4453-4461 (1949).
6O Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black concurred, in dissenting
from all three opinions, concluded that the effect of the majority decisions was to
"make a basic change not only in the two statutes involved in these cases but in the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 5, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4, 5; the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, 46
U.S.C.A. § 688; the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 782, 46 U.S.C.A. § 782; Mer-
chants Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1128d, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1128d; the Securities Act, 15
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The National City Lines case"1 came before the Supreme Court
for the second time on a motion for leave to file a petition for
certiorari to review the action of the District Court in applying
the doctrine of forum non conveniens on remand 2 notwithstanding
the contrary decision of the Supreme Court entered before enact-
ment of the new section. 3 The court denied the motion, thereby
sustaining the view of the District Court that, under the new sec-
tion, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable to actions
arising under the Clayton Act.
In Ex parte Collett" and Kilpatrick v. Texas and Pacific Rail-
way Co., 5 the Court held that, under the new section, the doctrine
of forum non conveniens was applicable to actions filed under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. In the Collett case petitioner,
in October, 1942, had brought suit under that Act against the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Illinois. No trial was had before
September 1, 1948, the effective date of the revision. Thereafter
the Railroad filed a motion to transfer the case to the District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, and the District Court,
upon a well-supported finding that such transfer would serve the
convenience of parties and witnesses and would be in the interest
of justice, granted the motion. Petitioner then filed a motion in the
Supreme Court for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus
and prohibition, contending that the order of transfer exceeded
the authority of the District Court. The Court concluded that, in
view of a direct reference to the Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kep-
U.S.C. §§ 77a, 77v, 15 U.S.C.A. §9 77a, 77v; the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a, 78aa, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a, 78aa; the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15
U.S.C. B 79, 7 9 y, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79, 79y; The Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a, 80a-43, 15 U.S.C.A. U 80a, 80a-43; and perhaps in other statutes too." United
States v. National City Lines, __ U. S. _ 69 S. Ct. 955, 958, - L Ed.
_ (1949).
61.. U. S .-......... 69 S  Ct. 955i -_ L Ed..- (1949).
62 United States v. National City Lines, 80 F. Supp. 734 (S. D. Calif. 1948).
63 See note 53 supra.
64 U. S. 69 S. Ct. 944, L. Ed. (1949).
... US. , 69 S. Ct. 953, L. Ed. ___ (1949).
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ner case"' in the reviser's notes, Congress intended that the new
section should be applied to cases arising under the Federal Em-.
ployers' Liability Act, and, accordingly, denied the motion.
Where a case is filed in the wrong division or district from the
standpoint of venue, it is no longer necessary for the court to dis-
miss the action. The law now provides that the district court of a
district in which a case is filed laying venue in the wrong division
or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, trans-
fer such case to any district or division in which it could have
been brought.67
REMOVAL OF ACTIONS FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURTS
The law formerly provided that when, in a suit filed in a state
court, there was a controversy wholly between citizens of different
states which could be fully determined as between them, either
one or more of the defendants actually interested in such contro-
versy could remove the suit into the district court of the United
States.6" The application of this language to specific cases gave
rise to considerable confusion and resulted in an attempt by the
courts to draw a distinction between separate and separable con-
troversies. The Supreme Court held that if there was a separable
controversy in the action, removal of that controversy necessitated
removal of the whole case.69 Lower federal courts held that if the
controversy was so far distinct from any other controversy or con-
troversies with which it was joined as to be "separate" rather than
"separable," it did not come within the scope of the statute; and
the application of the distinction so drawn resulted in wide diver-
gencies as to whether, in such cases, any part or all of the action
could be removed."
68 See note 56 supra.
8 728 U.S.C. § 1406(a), as amended (1948). See note 5 supra.
18 28 U.S.C. § 71 (1940).
69 City of Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 277 U. S. 54, 48 S. Ct. 454, 72
L. Ed. 781 (1928).
10 See notes in 41 HARv. L Rgv. 1048 (1928) and 35 ILL. L Rxv. 574 (1941).
SOUTH- WESTERN LAW JOURNAL
The new statute eliminates the concept of separable contro-
versy. It provides simply that whenever a separate and independ-
ent claim or cause of action, which would be removable if sued
upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable
claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed. The
district court is then given power to determine all the issues in
the case or, in its discretion, to remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction.7'
The law no longer provides for the removal of controversies
between citizens of different states upon the ground that prejudice
or local influence will prevent the defendant from obtaining jus-
tice in that state court or other state court to which the action
might have been removed for similar cause."2
Important changes have been made in the procedure for re-
moval. Formerly the petition for removal could be filed in the
state court any time before the defendant was required to answer
or plead to the complaint.7" Under the new procedure74 the de-
fendant desiring to remove any civil action or criminal prosecu-
tion from a state court must file a petition for removal in the
appropriate district court.
The petition for removal of a criminal prosecution may be filed
at any time before trial. The petition for removal of a civil action
or proceeding must be filed within twenty days after the receipt
by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the
initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which the
action or proceeding is based, or within twenty days after the
service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading
has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the
defendant, whichever period is shorter. If the case stated by the
initial pleading is not removable, a petition for removal may be
filed within twenty days after receipt by the defendant, through
7128 U.S.C. § 1441 (1948).
7228 U.S.C. § 71(d) (1940).
73 28 U.S.C. § 72 (1940) ; also note § 76.
74 28 U.S.C. § 1446, as amended (1948). See note 5 supra.
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service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion,
order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that
the case is one which is or has become removable.
The petition for removal must be verified. It need contain only
a short and plain statement of the facts which entitle the defendant
to removal, but must be accompanied by a copy of all process,
pleadings and orders served upon him in the action, and by a
bond"5 conditioned that the defendant will pay all costs and dis-
bursements incurred by reason of the removal proceedings should
it be determined that the case was not removable or was improp-
erly removed.
Promptly after the filing of the petition and bond the defendant
is required to give written notice thereof to all adverse parties
and to file a copy of the peition with the clerk of the state court,
which effects the removal. The state court may proceed no further
with the case unless and until it is remanded.
If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case
was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district
court may remand it to the state court by mailing a certified copy
of the order of remand to the clerk of the state court. The state
court may then proceed with the case and may order the payment
of just costs.' 6
The law formerly provided that no appeal would lie from the
decision of a district court remanding a cause to the state court
from which it had been improperly removed." Under this provi-
sion, it had been held that such order of remand by the district
court could not be reviewed either in the circuit court of appeals
or in the Supreme Court," although in Aetna Casualty Co. v.
Flowers, "9 decided in 1947, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
70 Except a petition for removal filed in behalf of the United States.
76 28 U.S.C. § 1447, as amended (1948). See note 5 supra.
77 28 U.S.C. § 71 (1940).
'8 Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U. S. 199, 61 S. Ct. 213, 85 L. Ed. 124 (1940);
Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U. S. 563, 61 S. Ct. 715, 85 L. Ed. 1044 (1940);
U. S. v. Rice, 327 U. S. 742, 66 S. Ct. 835, 90 L. Ed. 982 (1945).
79 330 U. S. 464, 67 S. Ct. 798, 91 L. Ed. 1024 (1947).
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to review an order of remand which had been issued by the cir-
cuit court of appeals. The proviso that no appeal would lie from
the decision of the district court remanding a cause to the state
court from which it had been improperly removed was omitted
from the revision and the question arose whether by reason of
such omission it was the intention of Congress to permit appeals
thereafter from such orders of remand. Any such question was
dispelled by a new provision inserted in the code by the May,
1949 amendments thereto, to the effect that an order remanding
a case to the state court from which it was removed is not review-
able on appeal or otherwise. 0 This language is considerably
broader than the former provision and would seem to be sufficient
to prevent the Supreme Court from reviewing an order of remand
issued by a court of appeals as well as by a district court and
hence to change the rule of Aetna Casualty Co. v. Flowers.
ABSENCE OF QUORUM IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court of the United States consists of a Chief
Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, any six of
whom constitute a quorum.8" Absence of a quorum on a case com-
ing to the Supreme Court from a court of appeals presents no
serious problem since the parties have already had the benefit of
one appeal. But where the law allows an appeal directly from the
district court to the Supreme Court, lack of quorum in the Su-
preme Court has the effect of denying the parties any appellate
review in a category of cases which, presumably, should have the
most careful and prompt review.
The law formerly provided for limited relief in situations of
this type where appeals were taken from district courts directly
to the Supreme Court in anti-trust and interstate commerce cases. 82
In the revision, relief was sought to be made generally available
8028 U.S.C. § 1447(d), as amended (1948). See note 5 supra.
8128 U.S.C. § 1 (1948).
82 See 25 U.S.C. § 29 (1940) and 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1940), each as amended June 9,
1944, c. 239, 58 STAT. 272.
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for cases in which a quorum was unavailable in a matter pending
before the Supreme Court.88
The law now provides that if a case brought to the Supreme
Court by direct appeal from a district court cannot be heard and
determined because of the absence of a quorum of qualified jus-
tices, the Chief Justice may order the case remitted to the court
of appeals for the circuit including the district in which the case
arose, to be heard and determined by that court either sitting in
banc or specially constituted and composed of the three circuit
judges senior in commission who are able to sit, as the order may
direct, the decision of such court to be final and conclusive.8"
In any other case brought to the Supreme Court for review,
which cannot be heard and determined because of the absence of
a quorum of qualified justices, the law now provides that if a
majority of the qualified justices shall be of opinion that the case
cannot be heard and determined at the next ensuing term, the
court shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the court
from which the case was brought for review with the same effect
as upon affirmance by an equally divided court.85
APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS
Writs of habeas corpus86 may be granted by the Supreme Court,
any justice thereof, the district courts, and any circuit judge, within
their respective jurisdictions. 7 It is desirable that, under ordinary
circumstances, applications for the writ be addressed in the first
instance to the district court having jurisdiction. The revision
seeks to accomplish this by providing that the Supreme Court,
any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to enter-
tain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer
53 To the effect that absence of quorum is "extremely" unique, see statement of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary appearing at page 1136, U. S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL
SERvicE (1944).
84 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1948).
85 Ibid.
8, On this subject generally see the scholarly discussion of Chief Judge John J.
Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONs 171 (1948).
87 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a) (1948).
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the application for hearing and determination to the district court
having jurisdiction to entertain it.88
It has been observed that "petitions for the writ are used not
only as they should be to protect unfortunate persons against mis-
carriages of justice, but also as a device for harassing court cus-
todial and enforcement officers with a multiplicity of repetitious,
meritless requests for relief." 9 At the 1948 term of the Supreme
Court, Mr. Justice Jackson discussed at some length the problem
of the "perennial petitioner."90 The law now provides that no
circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a
person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States, or
of any state, if it appears that the legality of such detention has
been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a
prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition
presents no new ground not theretofore presented and determined,
and the judge or court is satisfied that the ends of justice will
not be served by such inquiry.9 The law still leaves open the prob-
lem of disposing of an application for writ of habeas corpus based
upon new grounds which might, for aught that appears from the
application, have been presented in a previous application.92
In Ex parte Hawk,9 the Supreme Court laid down the rule
that "ordinarily an application for habeas corpus by one detained
under a state court judgment of conviction for crime will be enter.
tained by a federal court only after all state remedies available,
including all appellate remedies in the state courts and in this
Court by appeal or writ of certiorari, have been exhausted." The
scope of the rule of the Hawk case was considerably narrowed
by the decision of the Supreme Court in Wade v. Mayo,9" decided
88 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b) (1948).
:9 Dorsey v. Gill. 148 F (2d) 857. 862 (C. A. Dist. Col. 1945).
50 Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 68 S. Ct. 1049 (1948), (dissenting opinion).
:128 U.S.C. § 2244 (1948).
82 Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 26, 68 S. Ct. 1049 (1948).
:s 321 U. S. 114, 116, 64 S. Ct. 448,450, 88 L. Ed. 572, 574 (1944).
'4 334 U. S. 672, 68 S. Ct. 1270 (1948).
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at the 1948 term, in which it was held that a district court prop-
erly took jurisdiction of an application for writ of habeas corpus
to review a conviction by a state court in spite of the failure of the
accused to appeal from the original judgment of conviction or to
seek writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States
from the adverse decision of the highest state court on a petition
for habeas corpus instituted in the state courts. The revision pro-
vides expressly that an application for a writ of habeas corpus
in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
state court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant
has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the state,
or that there is either an absence of available state corrective proc-
ess or the existence of circumstances rendering such process in-
effective to protect the rights of the prisoner.95 This language
presumably will not change the rule of Wade v. Mayo because the
court found, under the somewhat unusual circumstances of that
case, that the accused had in point of fact substantially exhausted
his state remedies.
At common law, in circumstances in which habeas corpus would
not lie, the writ of error coram nobis might be issued by the trial
court as a remedy for infringement of a constitutional right of
the defendant in the course of a trial.96 The equivalent of this
ancient writ is now supplied by the provision that a prisoner in
custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum auth-
orized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence.97 Of considerable importance is the further
provision that an application for writ of habeas corpus in behalf
95 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1948).
'1 Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 64 S. Ct. 448, 88 L. Ed. 572 (1944).
97 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1948), as amended. See note 5 supra.
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of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for such relief may not
be entertained "if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply
for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that
such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
of his detention. ' 8
INJUNCTIONS AND THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS
In Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.,99 the Supreme
Court, in a divided opinion, held that the federal courts are with-
out power to enjoin the relitigation in state courts of cases and
controversies previously fully adjudicated in the federal courts.
The rule of this case appears to have been changed by the new
provision that a court of the United States may not grant an in-
junction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment."'
Applications for interlocutory or permanent injunctions must
be heard by a district court of three judges when brought to
restrain the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of
Congress for repugnance to the Constitution of the United States,
or of any state statute or order of an administrative board or com-
mission acting under state statute for unconstitutionality of such
statute. 1 The revision provides a uniform method for forming
such courts." 2 The district judge to whom the application for in-
junction is presented constitutes one member of the court. On the
filing of the application he immediately notifies the chief judge
of the circuit who designates two other judges, at least one of
whom must be a circuit judge. If the action involves the enforce-
ment, operation or execution of a state statute or state adminis-
98 Ibid.
9 314 U. S. 118, 62 S. Ct. 139, 86 L. Ed. 100 (1941).
100 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948).
101 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2282 (1948).
102 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1948).
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trative order, at least five days notice of the hearing must be given
to the governor and attorney general of the state; if the action
involves the enforcement, operation or execution of an Act of
Congress or an order of any department or agency of the United
States, at least five days notice of the hearing must be given to
the Attorney General of the United States and to the United
States attorney for the district. In any case in which an applica-
tion for an interlocutory injunction is made, the district judge to
whom the application is made may, at any time, grant a tempo-
rary restraining order to prevent irreparable damage, which
order will remain in force only until the hearing and determina-
tion by the full court. Any one of the three judges of the court
may perform all functions, conduct all proceedings except the
trial, and enter all orders required or permitted by the rules of
civil procedure. But a single judge may not appoint a master or
order a reference, or hear and determine any application for an
interlocutory injunction or motion to vacate the same, or dismiss
the action, or enter a summary or final judgment.
The Supreme Court has always been sensitive of the deference
properly due state judicial action. In Railroad Commission of
Texas v. Pullman Company... the Court held that, although a
three-judge district court had jurisdiction and power to issue an
injunction against the enforcement of an order of the Railroad
Commission of the State of Texas requiring all sleeping cars to be
in charge of Pullman conductors, on the ground that the order was
not authorized by Texas law and was in violation of the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, the district
court should withhold the exercise of its power so to do until the
Texas courts had been given an opportunity to pass upon the
question of the authority of the Commission under Texas law.
This deference is to a lesser degree now made statutory by the
requirement that a district court of three judges shall, before final
hearing, stay any action pending therein to enjoin, suspend or re-
103 312 U. S. 496, 61 S. Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed. 971 (1941).
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strain the enforcement or execution of a state statute or order
thereunder, whenever it appears that a state court of competent
jurisdiction has itself stayed proceedings under such statute or
order pending the determination in such state court of an action
to enforce the same. If the action in the state court is not prose-
cuted diligently and in good faith, the district court of three judges
may vacate its stay after hearing upon ten days notice served upon
the attorney general of the state.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW CODE
The purpose of the 1948 revision of the judicial code was not
to change, but to clarify and simplify the law."0 4 Nevertheless
changes were made, perhaps the most important of which have
been discussed above; and, since the entire code has been enacted
into positive law, a problem of interpretation inevitably will arise
over many of the new and revised sections.
It is well-established that in a general revision of the law no
changes will be found by the courts to have been made unless
the language permits of no other construction "for it will not be
inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws,
intended to change their effect, unless such intention is clearly
expressed.""1 In construing the new judicial code the intention of
Congress to change the effect of certain former laws may be found
in the reviser's notes appended to the report of the Committee on
the Judiciary to the House." 6 These notes discuss each section in
104 See for example statement of Representative Keogh, Chairman of the House
Committee on the Revision of the Laws at the hearing before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee: "The policy that we adopted . . . was to avoid wherever possible and
whenever possible the adoption in our revision of what might be described as sub-
stantive changes of law." Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R.
1600 and H. R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). Senator Donnell, Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, considering the code, said on the floor that ". . . the
purpose of this Bill is primarily to revise and codify and to enact into positive law
with such corrections as were deemed by the committee to be of substantial and non-
controversial nature." 94 CONG. REc. 7928 (1948).
105 Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 225 U. S. 187, 199, 32 S. Ct. 626, 630, 56
L. Ed. 1047, 1053 (1912).
106 H. R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
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which a change was effected, giving the reasons therefor. In the
first cases considered by it, in which construction of the revised
code was involved, the Supreme Court has given considerable
weight to the reviser's notes. 107 These notes, plus the many ex-
planations of the language used in the revision in the long
period of Congressional consideration thereof, will provide a
helpful aid to the courts in properly construing and applying the
new and revised sections of the code.
The thorough consideration given to the revision of the judicial
code by Congress, aided as it was by eminent judges and mem-
bers of the bar, and by private experts and consultants,' was
recognized by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Collett, decided
May 31, 1949.209
"This was scarcely hasty, ill-considered legislation. To the contrary,
it received close and prolonged study. Five years of Congressional
attention supports the Code. And from the start, Congress obtained
the most eminent expert assistance available. The spadework was en-
trusted to two lawbook-publishing firms, the staffs of which had
unique experience in statutory codification and revision. They formed
an advisory committee, including distinguished judges and members
of the bar, and obtained the services of special consultants. Further-
more, an advisory committee was appointed by the Judicial Confer-
ence. And to assist with matters relating to the jurisdiction of this
1or The Supreme Court first considered the reviser's notes in Stainback v. Mo Hock
Ke Lock Po, 336 U. S. 368, 376, note 12, 69 S. Ct. 606, 610, .....L. Ed ............. (1949).
See opinions in Ex Parte Collett, note 64 supra, and United States v. National City
Lines, note 61 supra.
10 The advisory committee consisted of Judge Floyd E. Thompson, former chief
justice of the Illinois Supreme Court and former president of the Chicago Bar Asso-
ciation; Hon. Justin Miller, former associate justice of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia; Judge John B. Sanborn, judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; Hon. Walter P. Armstrong of the
Memphis bar, former president of the American Bar Association; and Hon. John
Dickinson of the Philadelphia bar, former assistant Attorney General of the United
States. The advisory committee was assisted by Judge John J. Parker, chief judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and by two special con-
sultants: Judge Alexander Holtzoff, judge of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, and Prof. James W. Moore of Yale University. H. R. REP. No. 308,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
105 69 S. Ct. 944, 949 (1949).
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Court, Chief Justice Stone appointed an advisory committee, consist-
ing of himself and Justice Frankfurter and Douglas.
"... We cannot blind ourselves to the hearings, to the experts, to
the Committee reports, to the reviser's notes and their incorporation
in the Committee reports-to a history of the most meticulous Con-
gressional consideration."
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW CODE
The 1948 revision to the judicial code is an important milestone
in the improvement of the administration of justice in the courts
of the United States. It is a remarkable demonstration of the
effectiveness of an undertaking by Congress, in cooperation with
public-spirited judges and members of the bar, aided by special
consultants and private experts, to achieve progress in the field
of judicial administration. This achievement points the way to
similar undertakings by state legislatures, in cooperation with
similar advisory bodies of judges and members of the bar, for the
improvement of the administration of justice in state courts.
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